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INTRODUCTION
Major international banks and international investors use risk neutral default probabilities in pricing models for bonds and loans as well as real world default probabilities as an input to their credit risk management models to determine country risk exposure limits. According to the new version of the Basel Capital Accord -Basel II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004) , banks are allowed to use their internal ratings, credit ratings from rating agencies and their associated default rates in determining their required regulatory capital against credit risk. Thus, the ratings from rating agencies are important for international capital allocation. However, as examined in this study, default probabilities from rating agencies may not be adequate proxies for sovereign default probabilities.
This study utilizes models specifically developed for assessing sovereign default risk based on a sample of 124 emerging countries over the period . This study therefore covers recent period for an extended group of countries, as majority of the studies in the area focus on more limited samples. The models that we use for assessing probabilities of default are typical for these types of studies, however, they are further enhanced by use of Principal Component Analysis in identifying the main forecasting variables. The models are explained and tested in detail in Georgievska et al. (2005) .
The purpose of this study is to examine whether sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities derived from our models, which are specifically designed for sovereigns, are more appropriate measures of probability of sovereign default than credit agencies' default rates. The study, therefore, compares the estimated probabilities from our models with the assigned credit rating probabilities of three major international rating agencies, namely, Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Fitch. The main incremental contribution of this paper is therefore to compare the accuracy of determining default rate probabilities using our best forecasting models versus the ones provided by credit rating agencies 1 .
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The literature on sovereign debt suggest that a number of macroeconomic, political and capital markets factors influence the probability of a country's sovereign debt repayment difficulties. Sovereign default may either be triggered by countries' 'unwillingness' to repay their external debts or by countries 'inability' to repay their external debts due to insolvency or illiquidity. Thus, a country's solvency or the country's stock of debt in relation to the country's ability to pay can be measured by the GDP, government revenues or exports. If the discounted value of future trade balances exceeds the current external debt stock we can say that the country is solvent (e.g., Roubini, 2001 ). Subsequently, the exchange rate regime plays a role in the country's solvency since an overvaluation may lead to external imbalances that lead to debt accumulation. Moreover, theory suggests that the openness 2 can affect the country's willingness to default since the costs of default are affected (e.g., Eaton and Fernandez, 1995) . Macroeconomic stability affects the risk attitudes of investors; e.g. high inflation and high money growth deter investors from a country.
Illiquidity can also cause sovereign default, which is usually measured by the short-term debt to reserves or M2 to reserves. Finally, political and institutional factors can cause sovereign default since they affect the credibility of a country's policies and government willingness to adopt a sustainable debt strategy (e.g., Hemming and Petrie, 2002 and Hemming and Chalk, 2000) . 1 For the purpose of this study we have selected two out of four forecasting models developed in our previous study based on their superior level of forecasting ability. In addition, we have adjusted the data sample to match the country coverage with credit rating agencies for comparison purposes -reducing the sample from 127 to 124 emerging economies. 2 The higher the imports in relation to the size of the economy the more open is the country, thus more vulnerable to foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt rescheduling (e.g., Frenkel, 1983) A number of econometric studies, which mainly used panel logit and probit analysis, developed models that predict rescheduling/default events with a high degree of accuracy. In such models, the dependent variable is transformed into the probability of an event, which in our case, is the event of rescheduling; see also Rivoli and Brewer (1997) . The period analysed by key studies in the area mainly covers early 1970s to 1990s, except for Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000) which covered the period from 1971-
1998.
All empirical studies specify the dependent variable as a binary outcome that can take the value of 1 in the case of defaulting (rescheduling) and 0 in the case of non-defaulting (non-rescheduling) event. The empirical studies differ in defining what constitutes a default or rescheduling event
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A small number of explanatory variables are found to be systematically significant in most of the studies performed. Three financial ratios have been most often tested and found most consistently significant: reserves to imports (e.g., Aylward and Thorne, 1998) ; total external debt to GDP (e.g., Balkan, 1992, Detragiache and Spilmbergo, 2000 etc.) ; and total debt service payment to exports (e.g., Solberg, 1988 and Rivoli and Brewer, 1997) . Some macroeconomic and policy variables such as GDP growth, inflation and indicators of exchange rate overvaluation, are found to have a significant effect on country's ability to repay its debts in some studies, but are insignificant in others. A number of studies have tested the significance of the past repayment records and lagged rescheduling events, as an explanatory variable for a country's current repayment behaviour. All those studies, such as Hajivasiliou (1987, 1989 and 1994) , Solberg (1988) and McFadden et al. (1985) found that a country's historical debt servicing performance has a significant impact on its current repayment performance. Finally, political factors even though 3 Some studies define a country as in default if there is a debt rescheduling agreement or negotiations. Other studies consider sovereign default if there are arrears on principal or interest payments, or a country concludes an uppertranche IMF agreement.
found important (e.g., Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987) have been included in only a few studies mainly due to scarcity of data 4 . Some studies such as Schwartz and Zurita (1992) , and Lee (1991) tried to differentiate between a country's 'ability' to service its debts and its 'willingness' to do so by using macroeconomic and political proxies, but due to limitations in political variables data, most of the results obtained are insignificant.
Other variables suggested to be used in modelling sovereign debt re-scheduling are: loan demand and supply measured through international reserves, current account and debt service due as in McFadden et al. (1985) and Hajivassiliou (1989) which have not been found consistently significant; credit ratings for sovereign defaults and currency crises as in Reinhart (2002) and Rojaz-Suarez (2001) which exhibit poor predictive power; and debt ratios as in Berg and Sachs (1998) which yield more consistent results in explaining the differences in the repayment performance by countries.
Data limitations have prevented the close examination of predictive power of sovereign spreads for sovereign defaults. The data for sovereign spreads became available during the 1990s when the debts of commercial banks were securitized and converted into Bradies and Eurobonds that were easily traded.
However, most of the debt defaults occurred in the 1980s when spreads data were not available. A study performed by Dell'Ariccia et al. (2002) suggested that spreads are affected by moral hazard, since the spreads increased after the Russian non-bailout in 1998.
From the existing empirical studies on sovereign defaults reviewed in greater detail in Georgievska et al. (2005) , the variables that explain sovereign defaults can be classified into five groups: (1) Solvency 
EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION

Dependent Variable -Rescheduling Event
In common with most of the previous studies we define a rescheduling 'event' as occurring in the year a rescheduling agreement is finalized. Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that is binaryvalued in the sample i.e.
The value 1 or 0 in the above formulation is determined by using the 'total amounts of debt rescheduled' (TADR) figure in US dollars obtained from the World Bank Global Development Finance 2004. This does not distinguish between multilateral, bilateral or private creditors in different years, but our main interest is in the event of rescheduling, regardless of the type of debt involved. If a country i has a TADR bigger than zero in time period t, we consider that as rescheduling event, i.e. assign a value of '1' to this observation in time period t.
5 Private or official debt in relation to the capacity of repayment. 6 External debt service/reserves or External debt service/exports. 7 E.g. Money/Gross International reserves, Exchange rate devaluation, as per IMF research. 8 Real growth, exchange rate, inflation etc. 9 Variables that explain the country's 'willingness to pay', e.g. government stability, socioeconomic conditions, external conflict, internal conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, democratic accountability etc.
if country i reschedules its external debt in year t if country i does not reschedule its external debt in year t
Explanatory Variables
We originally started our analysis with 35 potential independent variables, as identified in the literature.
However, since such a large volume of the data can cause over-fitting in the model and multicolinearity, we performed a principal component analysis (as described in section 3.5.) in order to reduce the dimension of our data. We selected the most important variables that fulfil the following criteria: (1) the variables are individually and jointly significant in the econometric model; (2) the coefficients on the variables included in the model show their expected sign; and (3) the variables included optimize the fit of the model. The following eight variables generated the best fit for our models (Appendix 1 provides a We also included the lagged dependent variable (rescheduling event) as an explanatory variable to reflect the past repayment performance of a country.
Sample and Data
The study focuses on 124 emerging countries over the period . Appendix 2 lists the countries included in our analysis, the period examined for each country, and the rescheduling observations for each country. Data on external debt and amounts rescheduled are from Global Development Finance 
Principal Component Analysis -PCA
The reason for performing the PCA is to find the most parsimonious set of variables to include in our analysis, as well as to identify the interrelationships among the variables. For example, variables discovered to be highly correlated and members of the same factor (component) will be expected to have similar profiles. Our objective is to reduce most of the original information into a small number of factors for prediction purposes. PCA takes into account the total variance and derives factors that contain small proportions of unique variance and error variance. The primary reason for choosing a PCA analysis rather than other factor analysis is because PCA is more appropriate when the primary concern is about prediction or finding the minimum number of factors needed to account for the maximum portion of the variance represented in the original set of variables (e.g., Hair et al., 2003) . PCA results suggest that we can identify ten dimensions (components) in our data, and we have selected no more than two to three variables from each of those dimensions to include in the model. We believe those are sufficient for explaining the whole dimension. 
The Model
We are using panel logit models developed in Georgievska et al. (2005) The core equation or the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its debt at time t can be represented as follows: 
RESULTS
In this study we utilise two models for our analysis because Both Model A and Model B give us estimates of rescheduling probabilities that are going to be used for our further comparisons with the probabilities assigned by international rating agencies, i.e., Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch, as described in section 5.
In Model A, the most significant variables are the lagged dependent variable (rescheduling event) and the total debt/GNP. However, the coefficients obtained by the model are not the marginal effects since the logit model is non-linear and these coefficients do not assign any economic meaning to the variable.
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the independent variables except for the dummy lagged rescheduling variable where the marginal effect is calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1. When assessing marginal effects, we can observe that the current account balance/GDP ratio has the greatest economic importance. A one unit increase in current account balance/GDP will result in a 4.44% increase in the probability of rescheduling/default. Therefore, in economic terms, if a country experiences a large current account deficit this will induce the problem of servicing maturing debt if there is a shock that will disturb the country from accessing the international lending market. Two other variables with economic relevance are lagged dependent variable and international reserves/GDP with 2.14% and -2.68% marginal effects respectively. The remaining variables have considerably lower economic importance.
In Model B, the ICRG composite index, which is the proxy political risk factor included in this model, is significant at 5% level. According to the marginal effects, however, this is the most significant variable in economic terms. A one unit increment in the country's risk (one unit increase in ICRG) will result in a 3.78% decrease in the country's probability of rescheduling 13 .
Comparing Model A and Model B presented in Table 1 , one can observe that Model A has a higher percentage of correct classifications. However, taking into consideration type I and II errors neither of the two models outperforms since Model A outperforms in terms of type II error and under-performs in terms 12 F(βx) is the cumulative distribution function 13 Similarly, Balkan (1992) finds the political factors and proxies of political factors very significant variables in explaining a country's rescheduling/default and the country's risk exposure faced by international lenders. of type I error or vice versa. Thus, we can not simply choose a model by comparing the type I and II errors. However, since type I error and percent correct predictions are important mostly for international lenders, the model that maximizes the percentage correct predictions and minimizes the type I error would be preferred. Table 1 suggests that Model A maximizes the percent correct classifications but Model B minimizes the type I error better than Model A. Thus, estimated rescheduling probabilities from both Model A and Model B are going to be used for our further comparisons with the probabilities assigned by international rating agencies.
--Insert Table 1 here --
ESTIMATED MODELS' RESCHEDULING PROBABILITIES VS RATING AGENCIES' DEFAULT RATES
Sovereign Credit Ratings and Default Probabilities
The one year default/rescheduling probabilities estimated from Model A and Model B can be indirectly compared to the one year long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings from three leading credit rating agencies (CRAs) -Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch Ratings. Moody's sovereign rating system is mainly based on the default risk for medium and long term foreign currency debt obligations issued by a national government (Moody's Investor Service, 1995) . Standard and Poor's uses a similar rating system mainly based on each government's capacity and willingness to repay its foreign currency debt according to its terms (Standard and Poor's, 1997). Fitch's ratings specifically track sovereign defaults (Fitch Ratings, 2002) . Default/rescheduling probabilities obtained in Model A and Model B can not be directly compared to the letter ratings ranging from AAA (Aaa for Moody's, AAA for S&P's) to C by these rating agencies. Thus, a way to overcome this is to transform the letter ratings with their associated one-year cumulative default probabilities or ranges of default probabilities when appropriate.
Appendix 3 presents Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch's rating scales together with their most recent (2002) associated 1-year default probabilities. All three rating agencies compile 1-year cumulative default rates' data associated with their letter ratings tracking periods of up to 20 years. For instance, the average 1-year cumulative default rate associated with a rating grade of B2 (Moody's) is 6.81%, which is the historical number of obligors that defaulted within one year of being assigned a B2 rating grade expressed as a percentage of total number of countries and companies with B2 rating over the same one year period.
Moreover, most major banks use credit ratings and their associated default probabilities to feed their credit risk management models, to price bonds and loans, and to determine their country exposure limits.
According to the current version of the new international capital adequacy framework, commonly known as Basel II, banks are allowed to use internal rating models and associated default rates (mainly based on credit ratings by CRAs) to determine their required regulatory capital needed against credit risk exposure (Basel Committee, 2004) . Thus, credit ratings play an important role in the international capital allocation. However, the central issue is that the sovereign credit ratings of emerging markets are mainly based on corporate defaults since rating agencies have very little data on sovereign defaults. The reason is that very few sovereigns have defaulted since World War II when many rating agencies started collecting relevant data (e.g., Haque et al., 1998) . Therefore, rating agencies are faced with population problem for sovereigns.
Nevertheless, a most common practice by banks is to use corporate default rates as representatives for sovereign default rates. However, these are fundamentally different borrowers in terms of legal status as well as in terms of "solvency". Thus, such an assumption seems doubtful. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to examine whether sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities derived from models specifically designed for sovereigns, such as Model A and Model B in this study, are more appropriate measures of likelihood of sovereign default than rating agencies' corporate default rates. --Insert Table 2 here --These results overall indicate that rating agencies' default rates largely underestimate sovereign default risk over one year horizon. This is because rating agencies' default rates are mainly based on historical corporate default rates (with the exception of Fitch's rating specially tracking sovereign defaults). This finding is consistent with the common observation that emerging market sovereign bonds usually trade at much higher yield spreads than similarly rated US corporate bonds 14 . One interpretation is that emerging market sovereigns usually exhibit higher default probabilities than US corporates. Another interpretation is simply that rating agencies' sovereign ratings are generally too optimistic. This implies that corporate rating grades and their associated default probabilities generally do not appear to be good proxies for sovereign default probabilities.
Comparison of default/rescheduling probabilities in year 2002
A systematic underestimation of sovereign default risk might lead to underestimation of credit risk for banks, hence under-pricing of sovereign bonds and loans and excessive capital inflows to underestimated countries. Subsequently, unexpected global or country specific shocks such as unexpected policy shift (default) might trigger reassessment of the effective market and credit risks involved and ratings may quickly be downgraded. At that point, international investors (banks) will struggle to decrease their exposure in these, now more risky, countries. Consequently, following this process, a vicious circle may develop as capital outflows incur deteriorating country fundamentals, thus leading to more rating 14 International Monetary Fund, 2000 downgrading, resulting in a self-fulfilling crisis (see e.g. Hutchison and Neubetger (2001) , Goldstein et al. (2000) for further details).
CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the estimated sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities as per our models with the default rates associated to the sovereign credit ratings of three leading rating agencies, namely, Moody's,
Standard & Poor's and Fitch, provide insights into the adequacy and the applicability of sovereign credit ratings for international investors.
The results from the comparison between our modelled rescheduling/default probabilities and the Moody's, S&P's, and Fitch's associated default rates, yield conclusions in two main areas. Firstly, on an empirical level, it appears that rating agencies' default rates considerably underestimate sovereign default probabilities. Thus, rating agencies' sovereign default rankings usually lag in predicting defaults/rescheduling. Secondly, on a theoretical level, consistent underestimation of default rates by rating agencies might lead banks and other international investor to put excessive capital inflows in risky countries and to underestimate their risk exposure. So when a debt default occurs, this might lead to excessive capital outflows from those countries resulting in acceleration and deepening of the crisis.
One recommendation for further research is an analysis of whether rating agencies consistently underestimate emerging countries' default risk and if so whether such systematic underestimation leads to self-fulfilling debt crises. Tables, various issues (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) World 
APPENDIX 1 -Codes of Variables Used in the Study
Period Analysed
1981-2002
1981-2002 *significant at 10% level of significance **significant at 5% level of significance ***significant at 1% level of significance From the above distribution it is implied that the probability density function (PDF) of X is the following
And the CDF of the standardized error term u it is therefore
Thus, taking our binary dependent variable (Rescheduling it ) into the model, the probability of observing a rescheduling event in year t can be represented
Constructing the CDF of the standard error term symmetric with the property of the logistic distribution function, we obtain the probability of a sovereign rescheduling in the following form
and the probability that there will be no sovereign rescheduling 
where α and β can be estimated through the maximization of the likelihood function and through iteration solving for the parameters. (e.g., Greene, 2003) Even though we are interested in obtaining the above parameters in order to analyse the significance of the determinants of sovereign rescheduling probabilities, we also have to consider the fact that the logit model is a binary choice-model that is non-linear in terms of the parameters obtained as well as the independent variables. In this manner through the logit model we can obtain closed-form solution for the marginal effects of the determinants. Taking the partial derivative of the sovereign rescheduling probability solves for the marginal impact of the determinant on the probability of
where X it,k is the k th element of the X it determinant vector, and β k is the k th element of vector β.
As we can observe by comparing the above equation with the probability density function (PDF) there is linear function of the logistic PDF and the coefficient of the determinant β k that defines the marginal effect of the k th determinant on the probability of sovereign rescheduling
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. Thus, the marginal impact of all determinants of sovereign rescheduling not only depends on the size of the determinant itself but also on the size of all other determinants at that observation. The slopes of the linear function represent the marginal impact of the determinants and thus in order to evaluate them we will have to evaluate each slope with its respective determinant sample mean. (e.g., Greene, 2003) Therefore the core equation or the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its debt at time t can be represented as
The determinants X it that a country i will reschedule its sovereign debt can be stretched over time t or t+1, t+2, and the above expressions can be rewritten accordingly. The next section presents the results obtained through the panel logit model. Table 5 reports the unrotated factor matrix that is computed in order to assist us in obtaining a preliminary indication for the number of factors to be extracted. The matrix contains factor loadings for each variable and each factor. Higher loadings make the variable more representative of the factor. This will assist us in reducing the data and adequately interpreting the variables. In determining which factor loadings are significant we have used a cut-off point of ± 0.20 simply due to our sample size (e.g., Hair et al., 2003) .
Annex 2 -Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (may or may not be published)
Moreover, we have also rotated 17 the factor matrix (table 6) in order to obtain a more meaningful factor structure and improve the interpretation of the factors. From the identification of the most significant factor loadings for each variable on each factor, we have determined the dimension of each of the 10 factors (components) which were previously indicated by latent root criterion and scree test. The columns in tables 5
and 6 represent the 10 dimensions and the rows represent the variables contributing in each dimension (factor loadings). The extracted 10 dimensions are separate factors that explain the variability of the total set of variables, namely: 1. solvency or debt, 2. interest rates, 3. trade activity, 4. inflation, 5. credit to private sector, 6. economic growth, 7. liquidity related to reserves, 8. 'immediacy' dimension or simply the country's ability to service its debt and interest due by exports, 9. short term debt and finally, 10. the last component includes the current account balance/GDP and the domestic savings rate.
The above analysis is beneficial for determining which variables should be included in our econometric model as to avoid multicollinearity and over-fitting the model. Thus, from each dimension (component), we have selected no more than two to three variables to include in the model, which are sufficient in explaining the whole dimension. 
